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People perceive the consequences of their own actions differently to how they perceive
other sensory events. A large body of psychology research has shown that people also
consistently overrate their own performance relative to others, yet little is known about
how these “illusions of superiority” are normally maintained. Here we examined the visual
perception of the sensory consequences of self-generated and observed goal-directed
actions. Across a series of visuomotor tasks, we found that the perception of the
sensory consequences of one’s own actions is more biased toward success relative
to the perception of observed actions. Using Bayesian models, we show that this bias
could be explained by priors that represent exaggerated predictions of success. The
degree of exaggeration of priors was unaffected by learning, but was correlated with
individual differences in trait optimism. In contrast, when observing these actions, priors
represented more accurate predictions of the actual performance. The results suggest
that the brain internally represents optimistic predictions for one’s own actions. Such
exaggerated predictions bind the sensory consequences of our own actions with our
intended goal, explaining how it is that when acting we tend to see what we want to see.
Keywords: voluntary action, sense of agency, illusions of superiority, goal-directed action, action observation,
Bayesian, visual perception, sensorimotor prediction
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
People perceive the sensory consequences of their own actions
differently from similar sensory events that are externally caused.
For example, the sensory effect of one’s own action is typically
perceived to occur earlier in time (Haggard et al., 2002), and is
temporally “bound” in perception to one’s own action. Moreover,
the intensity of the sensory effect of a voluntary action is typi-
cally perceived as weaker than the same sensory event when it is
externally generated (Shergill et al., 2003).
Such differences between self- and externally generated out-
comes are not restricted to simple sensory perceptions: a large
body of psychology literature has shown that people tend to
overestimate their performance relative to others. For exam-
ple, most people rate their driving ability (Svenson, 1981) or
academic teaching performance (Cross, 1977) as above aver-
age. People also consistently show exaggerated optimism, unre-
alistically anticipating positive events in the future (Weinstein,
1980; Taylor, 1989). These “positive illusions” have been shown
to span many cognitive and motor abilities, and have been
linked to good mental health (Taylor et al., 2003b) and
reduced physiological response to stress (Taylor et al., 2003a).
Conversely, more accurate and less optimistic self-assessments
and predictions of future outcomes are made by individuals
with depression (Kuiper and MacDonald, 1982; Strunk et al.,
2006).
It has been suggested that positive illusions arise from
unrealistic predictions of performance, whereby optimistic
expectations bias people’s perception toward success (Dunning
et al., 2003). Beliefs or expectations can indeed influence one’s
perception (Sterzer et al., 2008; Seriès and Seitz, 2013), for exam-
ple, altering recognition accuracy (REF) (Sekuler and Ball, 1977)
or the perceived intensity of pain and emotion (Colloca and
Benedetti, 2005). The perception of the sensory consequences
of one’s own actions is modulated by beliefs about the cause of
the sensory event, including the attribution of causality to either
oneself or to an external agent (Desantis et al., 2011, 2012).
The perceptual changes induced by expectations or beliefs have
been successfully formalized and quantified using Bayesian mod-
els. Here, we bring together research on the perception of action,
on positive illusions and Bayesian models to investigate how peo-
ple perceive the sensory consequences of self-generated actions
compared to observed actions.We tested the hypothesis that a bias
in people’s perception of their performance results from unre-
alistic expectations of their own performance (Dunning et al.,
2003).
In Bayesian models of perception, expectations of possi-
ble outcomes are represented by priors (Kersten et al., 2004;
Körding and Wolpert, 2004). The brain generates perception
by combining priors with the imperfect sensory information
about the external world. The relative weighting given to priors
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and “sensory evidence” for this integration depends on their
reliability, such that less variable signals are weighted more for
perception. Perception of one’s own actions that is biased toward
success might have two main explanations in Bayesian models:
(1) Stronger priors with narrower distributions (smaller SDs)
have a greater effect on perception. For the perception of one’s
own actions, “optimistic” narrow priors distributed around the
intended goal would lead to a stronger bias toward the perception
of success during performance; (2) Less reliable visual evidence
(“likelihood”)—that is, more sensory noise would lead to an
increased reliance on priors and a greater perceptual bias. This lat-
ter hypothesis seems inadequate, since for perceiving the results
of their own actions, people have multiple sources of sensory
information, such as visual, proprioceptive and tactile signals.
However, by fitting a set of models, we could experimentally test
these alternate hypotheses.
Using novel visuomotor tasks, we first confirmed that the per-
ception of the sensory consequences is biased toward success for
one’s own actions more than for observed actions. In Experiment
1 we show that this discrepancy could be explained by self pri-
ors that represented optimistic predictions of success, i.e., priors
that are narrower than participant’s true performance distribu-
tion. The exaggerated priors were unaffected by learning, but were
related to individual differences in trait optimism. In contrast,
when observing actions, participants’ priors more accurately rep-
resent the true distribution of performance. In Experiment 2 and
3 we validated these results in different tasks and controlled for
potential confounding factors.
EXPERIMENT 1: MAIN EXPERIMENT
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental procedures
Participants in all experiments had no history of a neurological
disorder and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They all
provided written informed consent, and the study was approved
by the Cambridge Research Ethics Committee. During all exper-
iments, participants were seated 0.5m from a 17 inch Dell CRT
screen with 1024 × 768 resolution (25 pixels/cm) that refreshed
at 85Hz. All stimuli were displayed with Matlab Psychophysics
toolbox (Brainard, 1997).
Twenty right-handed participants (11 females) aged 20–35
years (mean 26; SD: 4) took part in Experiment 1. In the
experiment, participants performed the “Stop” task (Figure 1A),
in which a red circle target (15 pixel radius) was horizontally
centered close to the top of the screen. A blue ball (15 pixel
radius) repeatedly swept horizontally in a rightward motion at
1200 pixels/s, passing just below the target, and reappearing at the
opposite edge when it disappeared off the screen. The ball’s start-
ing position was randomized across trials (uniform distribution
covering the horizontal extent of the screen). The participant’s
task was to stop the ball when it was exactly below the target by
pressing a computer mouse button. Following the button press,
the ball disappeared and 250ms later the target disappeared.
Using the computer mouse, participants then moved a rectangu-
lar cursor (3 pixels wide × 30 pixels high) to indicate the ball’s
stopping position (i.e., final position before vanishing). The cur-
sor was constrained tomove horizontally, and its starting position
was drawn randomly from a uniform distribution ±150 pixels
around the target.
In addition to performing the task themselves (Self condition),
participants also observed the computer performing the task
(Agent condition). In the Agent condition, participants pressed
the mouse button when the computer stopped the ball. This
allowed us to monitor levels of attention to the Agent condition
throughout the experiment, and equate the Self and Agent con-
ditions with regard to motor demands. Participants indicated the
final position of the ball by moving the cursor as above. In the
Agent condition, we replayed the final position and number of
screen sweeps from each trial of the previous Self condition in a
permuted order. However, to minimize awareness that these were
replay trials, we limited the replay of outliers in terms of final
position or number of sweeps: for each set of Self trials we cal-
culated the mean and SD of the final positions and truncated the
replay position ±2 SD of the corresponding Self condition. We
also limited the number of screen sweeps to be between one and
four.
During both Self and Agent conditions, participants were
encouraged to fixate the target. In all experiments, Self and Agent
conditions were blocked, and the Agent blocks were always per-
formed after the Self blocks, so as to allow the computer to
approximate each participant’s performance (as described above).
In Experiment 1, participants first completed one practice and
two experimental blocks of each condition for acquiring “base-
line” measures, which were also used for correlating with a
questionnaire (see below). Subsequently, two “feedback” blocks
were performed for each condition. In these blocks, feedback was
given in order to explore the effect of learning: after each trial,
the target, ball and estimation cursor were displayed for 1.5 s,
indicating the veridical target, stopping, and estimation posi-
tions. The experiment finished with two blocks without feedback.
Each block included 52 trials. At the end of the session, partic-
ipants completed the Life Orientation Test (Scheier et al., 1994)
for assessing their trait optimism on a scale from 0 to 24 (most
optimistic).
Analyses
In each of the experiments, for each trial in a task with a target we
calculated the estimation error (i.e., distance between estimated
final position and true final position) and the performance error
(i.e., distance between true final position and target). To examine
any bias toward the target, we fit linear regressions of estimation
error against performance error for each task and condition and
for each participant. Trials with estimation times larger than 2
SD from the mean were excluded. In the Agent conditions, tri-
als with reaction times greater than 2 SD from the mean were
excluded in order to control for similar levels of attention to the
task. On average, six trials were excluded in each experiment for
each participant.
We inferred the priors used by participants for both Self and
Agent conditions in the following way: On each trial, we assumed
that for estimating the final position of the ball, participants can
use sensory evidence xevidence and a prior p(x). The variance of
the prior could reflect the distribution of participant’s perfor-
mance or their exaggerated expectations of success. Bayes’ rule
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FIGURE 1 | “Stop” task in Experiment 1. (A) In the Stop task,
participants were asked to stop a moving blue ball when it was aligned
with a stationary red target (Self condition) or watch the computer
stopping the ball (Agent condition). After the ball was stopped, it
vanished, and participants used a cursor to indicate the stopping point.
(B) Estimation errors (difference between estimated and true position)
plotted against performance errors (difference between the true position
and the target) for a typical participant in the Stop task with regression
line (dashed) and SDs (error bars) for Self (cyan) and Agent (magenta,
offset by 3 pixels for illustration).
could then be used to estimate the optimal final position of the
ball, by finding the maximum of the posterior:
p (x|xevidence) = p (xevidence|x) p(x)
p(xevidence)
With xprior corrupted by noise with variance σ 2prior and with
xevidence corrupted by noise with variance σ 2evidence, the optimal
estimate is then given by:
xestimate = w ∗ xprior + (1 − w) ∗ xevidence
where the weighting w is given by: w = σ 2evidence
σ 2prior+σ 2evidence
(Ghahramani et al., 1997; Ernst and Banks, 2002). Assuming
that the prior and the noise on the evidence are both Gaussian
(assumptions which are often made for Bayesian model fitting),
we used several Bayesian models to fit our data so as to maximize
the likelihood, i.e., the probability of each participant’s dataset.
We then used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz,
1978) to select the model that best accounted for the data, using
a threshold of BIC difference of 6 for “strong” evidence (Raftery,
1995). The model that was selected was used for all participants.
In Experiment 1, we assumed that xprior is centered on the
target and xevidence is centered on the true stopping position of
the ball (assuming no spatial shifts, which we test in Experiment
2). We fit the data with the following models: (1) The full model
included a separate σ 2prior and σ
2
evidence for Self and Agent condi-
tions (4 parameters); (2) A reduced model constraining σ 2evidence
to be identical across agents (3 parameters); (3) A reduced model
constraining σ 2prior across agents (3 parameters). For the best
model we found 95% confidence intervals on the parameters
of the fit by bootstrapping for 5000 samples with replacements
(Efron, 1988).
Using different priors across Self and Agent conditions allowed
us to test the main hypothesis that people have exaggerated
expectations of success for their own actions (a prior with a
smaller standard deviation). The use of the different visual evi-
dence allowed us to test whether the illusions of superiority might
arise from sensory noise being specifically increased for one’s
own actions, which would result in an over-reliance on prior
expectations and a greater perceptual bias.
RESULTS
In the main experiment we examined the difference between
the perception of self-generated goal-directed actions and exter-
nally generated action effects. We quantified this in terms of
Bayesian priors and explored whether these priors change with
explicit feedback of the action effect as well as the possible relation
between these priors and behavioral measures, such as positive
illusions and task learning.
Difference between perception of self-generated and observed
actions
We first measured the bias toward the target in the “Stop”
task (Figure 1A), examining participants’ estimation errors as a
function of performance errors. Estimation errors were biased
toward the position of the target—that is, participants con-
sistently underestimated their performance errors (Figure 1B).
Across participants, for both Self and Agent conditions this bias
was graded and dependent on performance errors, as revealed
by a consistent negative regression slope between estimation
error and performance error, [slopes smaller than zero for
both Self: t(19) = −6.233, p < 0.001; and Agent: t(19) = −2.907,
p = 0.009]. This bias was greater for Self relative to Agent con-
dition [t(19) = −3.93, p < 0.001], indicating that participants’
underestimation of performance errors was stronger for their own
actions compared to observed actions.
Priors for self-generated and observed actions
The perceptual bias toward the target could be explained if partic-
ipants use a prior that is centered on the target for estimating the
stopping position of the ball. According to Bayesian theory, the
stopping position could then be inferred as a weighted average of
the sensory evidence (“noisy” visual signals about the stopping
point) and the prior. Such a prior could represent the true statis-
tical distribution of performance (Körding andWolpert, 2004) or
could be narrower based on optimistic predictions of success (i.e.,
people expect to be more precise than they really are; Dunning
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 232 | 3
Wolpe et al. Illusory superiority: a Bayesian account
et al., 2003). Moreover, if the variability of the sensory evidence is
high for one’s own actions, there would be an increased reliance
on the prior, and an increased perceptual bias. To investigate these
hypotheses, we computed the priors and sensory evidence that
participants used by fitting the data with a set of Bayesian mod-
els. Importantly, we approximated the performance errors in the
Agent condition to each participant’s own performance by replay-
ing each participant’s performance errors in a permuted order.
Further, motor demands were equated in both conditions (see
Materials and Methods).
We fit the data with the following Bayesianmodels: (1) amodel
with a different variance of visual evidence and priors for the Self
and Agent conditions; (2) a reduced model with one parameter
for the variance of visual evidence and two parameters for the
variance of priors (one for each condition); (3) a reduced model
with one prior and a different visual evidence for each condition.
The results showed that model 1 was the preferred, compared to
both model 2 (mean group BIC difference of 4; individually in
13/20 subjects) and model 3 (mean group BIC difference of 18;
individually in 16/20 subjects). We thus report the SDs of visual
evidence and priors, which were derived from the fit of model 1,
and compare them across conditions.
Visual evidence SD tended to be smaller in Self relative to Agent
condition [t(19) = −1.766, p = 0.094], suggesting that increased
noise on visual evidence for Self relative to Agent condition
could not account for the increased bias toward the target. We
next compared the width of priors in the Self condition with
the width of priors in the Agent condition and to performance
SD (Figure 2A). The distributions of priors in the Self condi-
tion were narrower (smaller SDs) than performance distributions
[t(19) = −5.56, p < 0.001], suggesting that these priors are “opti-
mistic” and do not simply reflect the statistics of performance.
By contrast, the SDs of priors in the Agent condition were more
variable. Of the 20 participants that were tested, five had “flat”
priors, i.e., priors with very large SDs (>1E7). For the rest of the
participants, the SDs of Agent priors did not differ from the SDs
of performance errors [t(14) = −1.67, p = 0.24], but were greater
than the SDs of Self priors [t(14) = 3.48, p = 0.008; Bonferroni
corrected]. These Agent priors more closely represented the actual
performance distribution compared to Self priors, as shown by a
smaller absolute deviation from performance SD [t(14) = −2.49,
p = 0.03].
Next, we examined whether there was a consistent relation
between the distributions of priors and performance. The SDs of
Self priors were correlated with the SDs of performance errors
(Figure 2B; r = 0.662, p = 0.002; slope of 0.47), suggesting that
Self priors are scaled to individual performance. Agent pri-
ors were also strongly correlated with performance distribution
(Figure 2C; r = 0.76, p = 0.001, slope of 0.848). Moreover, the
SDs of Self and Agent priors also strongly correlated across partic-
ipants (including participants with flat priors, using Spearman’s
rho= 0.62, p = 0.004), indicating that although participants var-
ied widely, there was a consistent relation between the priors
applied to one’s own actions and those for observing actions.
This relation might simply reflect the covariance of the SDs of
both Self and Agent priors with the SDs of performance error.
However, the correlation between the SDs of Self and Agent priors
FIGURE 2 | Relations between priors for one’s own actions, priors for
observed actions and distributions of performance errors.
(A) Comparison of priors with performance SDs. Priors were narrower than
performance distribution in the Self condition. By contrast, in the Agent
condition, the SDs of priors were not different from performance in the 15
of 20 participants who showed Agent priors. Error bars indicate standard
error of the mean. Shaded gray bar indicates the group standard error of
the mean for performance errors. Significance levels indicated by
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01. (B) Self prior SDs plotted against performance
error SDs. A significant correlation emerged across subjects (cyan
regression line). Data of 18 of the 20 participants lie below the line of
equality (black dashed line). Error bars indicate 95% confidence bounds. (C)
Same as (B), but for Agent priors against performance error SDs.
remained significant even after removing the effect of the covari-
ance with performance (partial correlation; Spearman’s rho =
0.52, p = 0.023).
Relation between exaggerated Self priors and cognitive positive
illusions
If the distributions of priors for one’s own actions are linked to
positive illusions of Self, then the width of priors might be related
to individual differences in positivity such as trait optimism. We
used the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994) to
measure variability in generalized optimism across participants.
In a partial correlation analysis we accounted for variability in
performance, in order to examine the relation between Self pri-
ors and LOT-R, independently of performance SD, which strongly
correlated with the SDs of Self priors. The SDs of Self priors were
significantly correlated with LOT-R scores across participants
(Figure 3A; r = −0.474, p = 0.0402). This negative correlation
indicates that participants with narrower Self priors tended to be
more optimistic.
In order to further investigate the link between Self priors and
cognitive positive illusions, we examined whether the exagger-
ated priors would be altered when people are informed of their
overestimation of performance. If priors for one’s own actions
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FIGURE 3 | Relation between Self priors and cognitive positive
illusions. (A) Correlation of Self priors with LOT-R, with linear regression
line. (B) Self prior SDs plotted for the different feedback conditions. Prior
SDs did not differ across feedback conditions. Error bars indicate standard
error of the mean.
represent optimistic predictions of success that are linked to
positive illusions, then these priors should be unchanged even
when people receive feedback of their overestimation. To test
this, we provided participants feedback for their own perfor-
mance and estimation errors, by briefly displaying the veridical
stopping position and estimated position of the ball as well as
the target position after each trial. We examined the perfor-
mance errors, estimation errors and model parameters before,
during and after feedback, using repeated-measures ANOVAs
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected where appropriate). Feedback was
a within-subject factor with three levels (before, during, or after
feedback).
A main effect of feedback on performance error SD was found
[F(2, 38) = 6.645, p = 0.003]. Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected two-
tailed t-tests revealed a reduction in performance error SD dur-
ing, compared to before feedback [t(19) = −3.342, p = 0.006].
Moreover, a strong trend for a reduction in performance error
SD was found after compared to before the display of feed-
back [t(19) = 2.395, p = 0.054]. Visual evidence SD was similarly
affected by feedback [F(1.43, 27.15) = 13.133, p < 0.001], with sig-
nificant reductions during [t(19) = 3.889, p = 0.002] and after
feedback [t(19) = 4.575, p < 0.001], compared to before the feed-
back display.
Examining the effect of feedback on Self priors, no main effect
of feedback emerged [Figure 3B; F(1.51, 28.62) = 1.304, p = 0.28].
Moreover, as priors were related to performance error (see above),
we examined the difference between the two measures across
feedback conditions. Again, no main effect of feedback emerged
[F(2, 38) = 0.935, p = 0.401]. Lastly, the effect of feedback on
estimation errors, which according to our Bayesian models are
driven by priors and visual evidence, was thus only trending for
significance [F(1.41, 26.74) = 2.987, p = 0.083].
As feedback trials were performed after no-feedback trials,
these results could simply be related to the effect of practice.
To control for this, we examined the effect of learning when no
feedback was given during the first two blocks of trials. Here,
participants’ performance did not improve, as the SDs of per-
formance errors were not reduced in the second compared to
the first block [t(19) = −1.07, p = 0.297]. Importantly, similar to
the feedback manipulation above, the difference between the SDs
of performance errors and priors remained unchanged [t(19) =
1.11, p = 0.280].
Effect of priors on motor learning
If optimistic priors for one’s own actions could lead to an under-
estimation of errors, it is possible that participants with narrow
priors would show reduced motor learning and increased per-
formance variability. The positive relation between priors and
performance SDs across individuals (see above) does not sup-
port this, as it indicates that participants with narrow priors
performed better in the task, rather than worse, with reduced per-
formance variability. However, to examine this further, we looked
at individual variability in motor learning.
For each participant we calculated the extent of improve-
ment in the task as the difference between performance error SD
during and before feedback (which showed a highly significant
difference, above). Participants who were able to learn the task
better thus showed a more negative difference. Although there
was a negative relation between the extent of improvement in the
task and width of Self priors, it was not significant across par-
ticipants (r = −0.2597, p = 0.2689). We split the data into two
equally sized groups according to the median of individual differ-
ences in Self priors. Although again participants with wider priors
showed greater improvement in the variability of performance
errors, there was no significant difference between the groups
[t(18) = − 1.6006, p = 0.127].
EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION
We have shown that increased perceptual bias toward a target
could be explained by the use of narrower Self priors compared
to priors used for the observation of actions. The increased bias
could not be explained by an increase in visual noise, as there
was a trend toward reduced variability in sensory evidence for
perceiving the consequences of one’s own actions.
The variability of sensory evidence (the “likelihood”) for per-
ceiving the outcomes of self-generated actions tended to be
smaller compared to that of observed actions. This improved
precision for self-generated actions might reflect the combina-
tion of sensory and predictive information available about one’s
own actions. In addition to visual input, these include tactile
and proprioceptive information, and predictive signals based on
the efference copy of motor commands, providing more precise
information about the time of action and its consequent sen-
sory effect. Additional information compensates for uncertainty
in the visual stimuli. For example, although the estimation of
the stopping point was continuous in our experiments, the ball
stimulus moved on the screen in 14 pixel increments per 12ms
screen refresh. The visual uncertainty of 14 pixels could in prin-
ciple be dealt with by extrapolating the ball’s position according
to the time at which the ball was stopped. With multisensory
integration and predictive information during one’s action, such
extrapolation would be more precise in the Self condition.
Importantly, any differences in sensory precision that might
occur between Self action and observation could not affect our
estimates of the priors for the two conditions, as we allowed
our Bayesian models to have different sensory noise for the two
conditions. Estimation of the prior is thus independent of such
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noise. It is possible that multisensory and predictive signals would
somehow lead people to enhance the reliability of the priors for
their own actions compared to their observation priors. While we
cannot rule out this account, it could not explain why Self priors
are consistently narrower than performance, nor the correlation
of the width of priors with optimism (see below).
We found that participants used priors that represent exag-
gerated expectations of success for their own actions (explaining
the perceptual bias toward success), but priors that more accu-
rately represent the true distribution of performance for observed
actions. Could the fixed order, in which the Self condition pre-
ceded the Agent condition, account for the difference between
Self and Agent priors? This fixed order was preferred over the
conventional counterbalancing of conditions, in order to allow
the computer to approximate participants’ distribution of per-
formance error in the Agent condition. The exaggerated narrow
Self priors were still found even when only the Self condition was
performed (see Experiment 3). Moreover, in the experiment, Self
and Agent conditions were performed one after another—that is,
although Self condition was performed first, one Self block was
always followed by one Agent block, rather than a block design
of performing all Self trials before Agent trials. An order effect
would thus mean that the first Agent block could somehow affect
all Agent blocks (as priors were calculated based on all blocks),
however, this seems implausible.
People might in principle apply a different cost function when
acting themselves and when observing actions, but we suggest
that this is not sufficient to account for the difference between
Self and Agent conditions, for the following reason. If the prior
and sensory noise are Gaussian then the posterior must also
be Gaussian. Many standard cost functions (e.g., mean squared
error, absolute error, hit rate, or absolute error raised to any
positive power) would identify the peak of the posterior distri-
bution. This would also be true even if the prior and noise are not
Gaussian, as long as the posterior is symmetric. Therefore, under
their general assumptions, many alternate cost functions would
not affect our estimate of the prior or sensory noise. This state-
ment would not be true for atypical cost functions (asymmetric
non-Gaussian), but such cost functions would require a special
justification.
We observed a higher individual variability for Agent priors
(vs. Self priors), with some participants showing “flat” Agent
priors. This larger variability might be because people need
more trials to learn the variance of performance distribution of
observed stimuli. However, the number of trials provided in our
experiment was not smaller than in a previous study, in which
participants still demonstrated the use of priors (Berniker et al.,
2010). Moreover, individual differences in assigning agency to the
computer’s “actions” might have also contributed to individual
differences in Agent priors, and observing actual movements of
another human agent might affect these observation priors (see
General Discussion). Interestingly, although Self and Agent pri-
ors varied widely across participants, both priors for one’s own
actions and priors for observation were related to the individual’s
actual distribution of performance. In the General Discussion we
discuss what might explain this consistent relation in the width of
priors.
There was also a consistent relation between the width of
Self priors and participants’ individual differences in optimism,
such that participants with narrower priors were more optimistic.
Moreover, the results of the feedback conditions suggest that even
when participants used feedback to improve in the task in terms of
their performance errors, their priors did not significantly change
and did not become more similar to the distribution of perfor-
mance. These findings strongly support the cognitive illusions of
superiority, to which we return in the General Discussion. Lastly,
the data did not provide clear evidence for a relation between pri-
ors and motor learning, however, the nature of this experiment
does not allow to rule out this possibility.




Ten participants (five female) aged 19–27 years (mean: 24 ± 2)
took part in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, the Stop task was
performed with both directions of ball motion in order to exam-
ine the effect of directionality and whether the priors were in
fact centered on the target, as assumed in Experiment 1. The
ball’s direction of motion (leftward or rightward) was random-
ized across trials. The task was otherwise identical to the Stop task
in Experiment 1.
In the Stop task in Experiment 1, the ball vanished immedi-
ately after the action, preventing manipulation of sensory uncer-
tainty. We therefore manipulated sensory uncertainty in a new
“Release” task (Figure 4A). In the Release task, the target was at
the bottom of the screen. The ball moved horizontally in a right-
ward motion across the top of the screen (490 pixels vertically
above the target). The participant’s task was to press the mouse
button to release the ball so as to hit the target. On release, the ball
fell to the target plane in 47ms (4 screen refreshes) while moving
horizontally at 2400 pixels/s. In other words, the ball did not drop
straight, but had a constant lateral displacement which partici-
pants learned during practice trials, in which the full trajectory
was displayed. Based on pilot experiments, the increase in hori-
zontal speed was used in order to make the task more demanding.
Upon release, the ball vanished, and participants were asked to
estimate the ball’s final position, based on the “dropping” point
(i.e., when the button was pressed), the lateral displacement of
the descent and the different levels of feedback. We manipulated
feedback in three ways: (1) displaying the ball for 24ms as it
reached the target plane; (2) displaying the ball for 24ms when
it was halfway to the target plane; or (3) not displaying the ball
after release. These three feedback levels provided low, medium,
and high levels of uncertainty with regard to the landing posi-
tion. Feedback levels were pseudo-randomly interleaved across
trials, such that overall, the same number of trials was carried
out for each feedback level. Again, after the ball had vanished,
participants moved a cursor to indicate the ball’s final position
(here the landing position). As in the Stop task, participants also
performed an Agent condition, watching the computer perform-
ing the Release task; performed a reaction time task on when the
ball was released; and indicated the ball’s final position with the
cursor.
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To examine any spatial bias toward a certain point in the
screen, we also included two “No Target” tasks, in which no visible
target was displayed. Participants were asked to stop or release the
ball at any time in its sweep in the Self condition or to watch the
computer stopping or releasing the ball in the Agent condition.
Again, participants indicated the final position of the ball.
Participants performed all tasks during two sessions, on sepa-
rate days. Each session began with one practice block for each task
and for the Self and Agent conditions. The practice blocks were
identical to the experimental blocks for Stop and No Target Stop
tasks. However, for Release and No Target Release tasks we dis-
played the ball throughout its descent to the target plane during
practice trials, allowing participants to learn the properties of the
descent. We note that although the descent trajectory makes the
fall physically unrealistic, this does not affect our comparison of
the Self and Agent conditions, as in both cases the ball descended
in the same manner.
Each session included four experimental blocks for each task
and condition in a pseudo-randomized order (with Agent fol-
lowing Self, as above), counterbalanced across participants. Each
Stop and No Target Stop blocks included 32 trials, and each of
the Release and No Target Release blocks included 48 trials. To
control for eye movements, during the first experimental block in
the second session, eye gaze position was recorded using an SMI
iView X™ Hi-Speed eye tracker with a sampling rate of 500Hz.
Gaze events were detected using SMI BeGaze 3.0™.
Analyses




σ 2prior + σ2evidence
(see Experiment 1), rewriting the second equation from
Experiment 1 thus gives:
xestimate − xevidence︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimation error




The magnitude of the negative slope of the linear regression fits
therefore corresponds to the weighting w. We thus inferred the
weighting for the Release task directly from the regression.
We next fit the two directions of motion separately in the Stop
task, in order to examine any possible directional shifts in the
means of sensory evidence and prior distributions. We fit a set of
more complex models, now without assuming absence of shifts,
wherein the optimal estimate is:
xestimate = w ∗ (xprior + shiftprior) +
(1 − w) ∗ (xevidence + shiftevidence)
As the visual shifts were in the direction of motion in the No
Target task (see Results), we assumed that shiftevidence, related to
a directionality effect of the ball motion would be opposite in the
two directions of motion. In the full model, for each condition
(Self and Agent), there was a separate shiftprior, shiftevidence, and
σ 2prior; The σ
2
evidence was separate for each condition and direction
of motion (10 parameters in total). Another model was fit, in
which σ 2evidence was constrained across directions of motion (8
parameters).
RESULTS
Bayesian integration under different levels of sensory uncertainty
In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate the results of Experiment
1 while controlling for several possible confounding factors,
including the direction of motion of stimuli, spatial and direc-
tional shifts and differences in overt attention. We first examined
the use of Bayesian integration under different levels of sensory
uncertainty. According to Bayesian theory, the weighting of the
prior should increase with increased sensory uncertainty (i.e.,
with more “noise” on sensory evidence). We manipulated the
sensory evidence in the “Release” task (Figure 4A), which pro-
vided low, medium or high levels of uncertainty for estimating
the ball’s final position.
We inferred the weighting directly from the regression, as
the magnitude of the negative slope corresponds to the relative
FIGURE 4 | “Release” task in Experiment 2. (A) In the Release task,
participants released the ball (Self) or observed it being released (Agent), so
as to drop it onto a target. We varied the visual feedback in one of three
ways: by only displaying the ball as it reached the target plane; displaying it
briefly at the halfway point; or not displaying the ball after release. This
manipulation provided low, medium, or high levels of uncertainty, before
participants again estimated the ball’s final position. (B) Across participant
mean weighting (from regression slopes as in Figure 1B) for Release task.
Error bars indicate SE. Significance levels of post-hoc tests indicated by
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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weighting of the prior (seeMaterials andMethods).We compared
the weighting across the different levels of sensory uncertainty, by
submitting the data to a repeated-measures ANOVA, with sen-
sory uncertainty (low, medium, high) as a within-subject factor.
A significant main effect of uncertainty on the weighting emerged
for both Self [F(2, 18) = 12.611, p < 0.001] and Agent conditions
[F(2, 18) = 12.322, p < 0.001]. Post-hoc two-tailed (Bonferroni
corrected) comparisons showed that as predicted by the Bayesian
theory, the weighting was greater under high uncertainty feed-
back (Figure 4B), suggesting increased reliance on a prior for the
perception of performance [Self: high-medium t(9) = 5.63, p <
0.001 and high-low t(9) = 3.83, p = 0.004; Agent: high-medium
t(9) = 5.3, p < 0.001 and high-low t(9) = 3.59, p = 0.006].
Spatial and directional shifts
So far we have shown that participants’ estimates were consis-
tently biased toward the position of the target; a bias which we
have explained through the use of priors. However, our results
might be confounded by other visual biases or shifts arising
from the nature of the stimuli. Particularly, participants might be
generally biased toward a certain point on the screen; or their esti-
mates might be shifted as a result of the ball motion.We examined
these possible visual confounders.
Across participants, we found no consistent spatial bias in esti-
mation errors toward a certain point in the screen in a “No Target”
task (Figure 5): regression slopes were not significantly different
from zero for both Self and Agent [Self: t(9) = 0.8856, p = 0.4;
Agent: t(9) = 1.556, p = 0.154]. Instead, estimation errors were
consistently in the direction of ball motion, as previously found
for the perception of moving stimuli (Freyd and Finke, 1984;
Hubbard and Bharucha, 1988; Stork and Müsseler, 2004).
Since estimation errors were consistently shifted in the direc-
tion of ball motion in the absence of a target, we explored such
possible directional shifts in the means of priors and sensory evi-
dence. Participants performed the Stop task now with the two
directions of ball motion. We fit a set of models to the two direc-
tions of motion separately, allowing for the means of priors and
sensory evidence to vary (i.e., without constraining their means).
FIGURE 5 | “No Target” task in Experiment 2. The data of a typical
participant in the No Target Stop task, in which participants stopped the ball
at any time in its sweep (Self) or watched it being stopped by the computer
(Agent). Estimation errors are plotted against the ball position (distance
from the center of the screen) for when the ball was sweeping in a
rightward (filled circles) and a leftward (empty circles) motion. Error bars
indicate SD. Estimation errors were not consistently shifted toward a
certain point on the screen, but were typically in the direction of the ball’s
motion.
Based on both single-subject (10/10 participants) and group
level model evidence (mean BIC difference of 17), the model that
was selected had one SD of sensory evidence for the two directions
of motion. The mean of sensory evidence was not different from
zero across participants for both Self [t(9) = 0.18, ns] and Agent
[t(9) = 1.58, p = 0.15] conditions. Moreover, the means of priors
were not consistently different from the position of the target for
both conditions [Self: t(9) = −1.05, p = 0.32; Agent: t(9) = 0.01,
ns]. These results suggest that overall there were no consistent
directional or spatial shifts in the Stop task—that is, the prior
mean was not consistently shifted from the target position, and
the sensory evidence mean was not consistently shifted from the
true stopping position of the ball.
Crucially, the main pattern of results in this modified Stop task
and in the Release task described above was consistent with the
results of Experiment 1. That is, Self priors were narrower than
both the distributions of performance (in 9/10 subjects for mod-
ified Stop task and 8/10 for Release task) and Agent priors (in
10/10 subjects for both modified Stop and Release tasks).
Eye gaze position in Self and Agent conditions
Strategic or overt attention differences between Self and Agent
conditions were examined by monitoring eye gaze position
(Figure 6). An analysis of fixation proportion times across partic-
ipants was performedwith a circular area-of-interest. The selected
size of this area was 6-times the target’s size, which captured
most of the variability in participants’ fixation times, relative
to other diameters. The analysis showed no effect of condi-
tion [F(1, 9) = 0.62, p = 0.451] or condition × task interaction
[F(1, 9) = 0.423, p = 0.532]. These results suggest that partici-
pants fixated similarly around the target during both Self and
Agent conditions.
EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION
The data of Experiment 2 confirmed that the results of
Experiment 1 were likely to be due to differential Bayesian inte-
gration, with optimistic Self priors. In contrast, the results could
not be explained by directional or general spatial shifts in sen-
sory evidence or priors. The discrepancy between Self and Agent
priors were unlikely to be due to differences in strategy or overt
attention in terms of eye gaze position, which was similar across
conditions. The exaggerated Self priors and more accurate obser-
vation priors persisted in these different control conditions of the
experiment.
It is worth considering that the perception of feedback could
differ when the sensory outcome results from self-generated and
observed actions. For example, the visual feedback might be more
informative when it is self-caused, as one could better predict the
time at which the feedback is going to be displayed. However, the
pattern of results across the different levels of uncertainty was
consistent for both Self and Agent conditions: the weighting of
priors was increased under high uncertainty, with a similar extent
of increase across these conditions (see Figure 4B). Similarly,
overt attention to the feedback was similar across conditions, as
demonstrated by eye gaze position data. Notwithstanding this
innate difference in the use of feedback in self-generated and
externally caused actions, these results suggest that both Self and
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FIGURE 6 | Eye gaze position in Self and Agent conditions. Heat
maps illustrating the mean fixation time as a percentage of block
duration for a typical participant in the Stop and Release tasks,
superimposed on the target (opaque red). For illustration, an area of
interest was selected so at to capture at least 98% of fixation
duration data. For each task, this area was then “down-sampled” to
5 × 5 pixels datasets, where the color in each data point indicates
the percentage of fixation duration.
observed priors are integrated with sensory evidence in a sim-
ilar uncertainty-dependent manner for generating a percept, as
predicted by the Bayesian theory.
Importantly, when no target was displayed or specified in the
No Target task, estimation errors were typically in the direction
of motion, as described in the representational momentum phe-
nomenon (Freyd and Finke, 1984). The spatial shifts were smaller
when the ball was stopped by oneself relative to when it was
stopped by the computer (see Figure 5). This pattern of results
can be explained by the additional information one has about
the sensory consequences of one’s own action, as well as by the
causality-induced spatial compression (Buehner and Humphreys,
2010). In the causality-induced compression, perceived causality
relation can lead to a spatial contraction between a cause (e.g.,
an action) and its consequence (e.g., an ensuing sensory event).
This might thereby reduce the spatial shifts of the representational
momentum in the Self condition.
However, causality-induced compression cannot explain the
consistent bias toward the target in the tasks in which a target
is displayed or specified: the causality-induced space compres-
sion predicts that people’s perceptual estimates would be shifted
toward the point where an action was made—that is, where the
ball was dropped or stopped, and hence a more accurate esti-
mate, relative to observation. This prediction is not consistent
with our results of a consistent bias toward the target and not
toward the stopping or dropping point. Estimation errors were
either to the right when the ball was stopped or dropped to
the left of the target or to the left when the ball was stopped
or dropped to the right of the target. This bias toward the tar-
get is thus qualitatively different to a causality-induced spatial
compression.
EXPERIMENT 3: DIFFERENT VISUAL CONFIGURATIONS
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Six additional participants (four female) aged 21–27 years (mean:
24.5 ± 2) performed two control tasks to examine the effect of
the visual configuration of targets. In one task, three red circles
were displayed at the top of the screen, two of which were hor-
izontally displaced ±100 pixels from the standard central target
circle. In each condition, one of the three red circles was verbally
specified as the target, and participants were asked to stop the
moving ball when it was just below that target. This allowed us
to assess whether estimation errors were related to the specified
target, which varied between conditions, rather than simply the
visual configuration, which was fixed across conditions.
In the second task, no visible target was displayed, and partici-
pants were asked to stop the ball when it was horizontally centered
on the screen. This allowed us to examine estimation errors to
an implicit target that had to be inferred, rather than the visibly
specified targets in the other tasks.
Participants performed one practice and five experimental
blocks for each task. The three conditions in the first task and
the one condition in the second task were blocked, and were per-
formed in a randomized order across participants. After a practice
block, three experimental blocks were performed for each condi-
tion, with each block including 40 trials. For fitting the data, we
used the same model as in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
In Experiment 3 we tested whether the bias toward the target and
exaggerated Self priors persisted in different visual configurations
in two control tasks. In the first task, three red circles were dis-
played at the top of the screen, and in each set of trials, one red
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circle was verbally specified as the target. Estimation errors were
biased toward the specified target. As before, regression slopes
were smaller than zero for all participants and for all targets. All
priors were again smaller than performance SD, except for the
case of one target for one participant.
In the second task, no visual target was displayed, and the tar-
get was only implied at the center of the screen. Estimation errors
were again biased toward the center of the screen, with regres-
sion slopes always smaller than zero for all six participants. Prior
SDs in five of the six participants were smaller than performance
error SDs.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our study finds that people’s perception of their goal-directed
actions is biased toward success. Using Bayesian models, which
have accounted for different phenomena in visual perception
(Kersten et al., 2004), we examined the larger perceptual bias for
one’s actions. We found that the bias can be explained by pri-
ors that are more narrowly distributed around the intended goal
compared to the true distribution of performance. These nar-
row Self priors were related to participants’ own performance
and individual trait optimism, and were not influenced by learn-
ing. In contrast, priors used when observing actions more closely
represented the actual distribution of performance.
The data from our control experiments showed that the exag-
gerated Self priors for one’s actions could not be explained by a
directionality effect or by a particular visual configuration of the
stimuli. Moreover, although the Self and Agent conditions were
different in several respects, we tested and controlled for several
potential confounders. We showed that the discrepancy between
priors for one’s actions and for observed actions could not be
explained by differences in overt attention strategy, observed
performance distribution or motor demands.
MECHANISMS OF SELF PRIORS
In the sensorimotor system, priors are often obtained by learning
to associate an action with its sensory effect over time (Körding
and Wolpert, 2004; Synofzik et al., 2006). However, stable Self
priors in our task were apparent in the first block of trials in
Experiment 1.Moreover, the five participants who did not reliably
obtain observation priors still all demonstrated Self priors, sug-
gesting the acquisition of Self priors and observation priors does
not rely on the samemechanism. By contrast, both Self priors and
observation priors were strongly correlated, and both were related
to the distribution of performance. About 44% of the variability
in Self priors across participants was explained by performance
variability (see Figure 2B), suggesting that even the unrealistic
predictions of one’s own success are scaled to one’s actual per-
formance (Ehrlinger and Dunning, 2003). Independently of their
correlation with the distribution of performance, Self priors also
correlated with observation priors. This relation suggests that
across participants, some of the variability of both Self and obser-
vation priors might reflect individual differences in the general
ability to form reliable predictions.
The relation between Self priors and individual differences in
overall performance is intriguing, given the rapid acquisition and
the independence of the optimistic predictions from feedback
(see below). One explanation is that people may use their past
experience of similar tasks to form an approximation of their per-
formance even before starting a new task. Another possibility is
that people form a fast approximation of their performance after
only a few trials, which is in part supported by previous studies
(Berniker et al., 2010). In both cases, after learning, people could
update their measurement of performance and adjust their priors
(as Self priors are scaled to performance), while keeping a simi-
lar level of exaggeration in these priors (as the difference between
priors and performance remained similar with learning).
The exaggerated reliability of Self priors may result from an
interaction between different prediction processes. For example,
an efference copy of the motor command might provide the low-
level sensorimotor prediction for motor adaptation (Wolpert and
Ghahramani, 2000). These low-level predictions are acquired by
learning the relation between an action and its effect over trials
and can thereby reflect the performance in a task (Körding and
Wolpert, 2004). On the other hand, high-level beliefs or expec-
tations about the task could “exaggerate” the reliability of these
priors, thereby linking the priors with illusory superiority and
metacognitive measures, such as trait optimism. This low-level
sensorimotor prediction and high-level perceptual expectations
are likely to be supported by distinct mechanisms in the brain.
Our data do not address the question of how the brain rep-
resents the exaggeration of sensorimotor predictions. Cognitive
positive illusions have been previously related to higher cogni-
tive areas in the medial and lateral frontal cortex, particularly the
anterior cingulate and amygdala of the mesolimbic and mesocor-
tical pathways (Sharot et al., 2007; Beer and Hughes, 2010). It is
possible that these areas exert a top-down modulation over sen-
sorimotor areas, leading to the exaggeration of predictions and
biased perception. The mechanism might also arise from reduced
tracking of errors that call for a negative or pessimistic update
of beliefs, mediated by the right inferior prefrontal gyrus (Sharot
et al., 2011).
SELF PRIORS AND ATTRIBUTION OF ACTION
The difference between Self priors and observation priors builds
upon previous work, showing that the perception of self-
generated actions is different to the perception of external sensory
events. A well-known example is the attenuation of the perceived
intensity of one’s action compared to when the same sensory
stimulus is externally produced (Shergill et al., 2003). This sen-
sorimotor attenuation relies on a prediction process (Bays et al.,
2006), and has been suggested to facilitate the attribution of
self-generated actions (Shergill et al., 2005).
Perceived success has also been demonstrated to contribute to
the attribution of sensory consequences to one’s own actions. For
example, successful sensory outcomes tend to be attributed more
to one’s own actions than to an external source (Dewey et al.,
2010). Similarly, people are less likely to detect an external pertur-
bation to their actions, as long as their intended goal is achieved
(Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). Moreover, the perceived tem-
poral attraction of an action toward its sensory effect, which has
been used as an implicit measure of agency (Haggard et al., 2002),
is strengthened for actions that are associated with successful out-
comes (Isham et al., 2011). Thus, the exaggerated expectations of
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success measured in Self priors and their consequent perceptual
bias may enhance the self attribution of the sensory effects that
result from one’s own actions.
The sense of agency depends on an integration of multi-
ple cues, including low-level sensorimotor signals and high-level
expectations and perceptual processes (Synofzik et al., 2013). As
noted above, Self priors might reflect this interaction of low-level
predictions with high-level expectations, thereby capturing some
of the key underlying mechanisms of the sense of agency. Future
studies will shed light on how variability or changes in the expe-
rience of agency are reflected in the magnitude of exaggeration of
Self priors for the perception of the consequences of one’s actions.
STABILITY OF SELF PRIORS WITH FEEDBACK
Veridical feedback of both performance and estimation did not
affect the Self priors. Feedback improved the performance of
participants in our task, both by reducing the variability in per-
formance errors and by reducing the variability in visual noise
for estimation. However, the estimated Self priors were unaffected
by learning, as their distribution did not differ before, during or
after the presentation of feedback. That is, even informing par-
ticipants of their underestimation of performance errors did not
change this behavior. Together with the association between the
width of Self priors and trait optimism (see below), these findings
speak directly to cognitive positive illusions, with which people
persistently maintain a positively biased image of themselves and
their future (Taylor et al., 1989). In other words, people fail to
update their positive expectations of their own capabilities and
of future events, even when confronted with reality (Armor and
Taylor, 2002; Dunning et al., 2003). Our data suggest that this
failure may result from a stable representation of unrealistically
positive expectations in the brain.
EFFECT OF NARROW SELF PRIORS ON SENSORIMOTOR LEARNING
From the perspective of sensorimotor learning, it would seem
sub-optimal for priors to over-represent the success of one’s own
performance, since learning critically depends on reliable and
precise sensory feedback (Todorov and Jordan, 2002). In motor
control theory, the comparison between the estimated state of
the world and the desired state is crucial for updating the motor
output in order to accurately achieve the desired goal (Wolpert
and Ghahramani, 2000). Self priors leading to a diminished per-
ception of one’s own errors could impoverish this process by
providing feedback that minimizes errors. Learning could there-
fore be impaired, resulting in increased long term performance
errors.
High-level perceptual processes can, however, be independent
of sensorimotor prediction processes. Whereas high-level expec-
tations or beliefs about a task can change perceptual judgments
(Sterzer et al., 2008), they may not influence sensorimotor pro-
cesses, such as motor learning (Flanagan and Beltzner, 2000).
These parallel systems may lead to a discrepancy between motor
performance, which can still adapt properly to a changing envi-
ronment, and illusory sensory perception (Flanagan and Beltzner,
2000). Consistent with this hypothesis, we did not find evidence
for a negative effect of Self priors on motor learning. There
was neither a consistent relation between the extent of improve-
ment in our task and the width of priors, nor a difference in
learning between participants with more and participants with
less narrow priors (although the lack of statistical significance
could also be related to a lack of power in the analyses). Further,
the positive relation between performance and priors indicate
that participants with narrow priors were superior in perfor-
mance relative to participants with wider priors. The possible
effect of narrow priors on learning remains to be investigated in
future studies.
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE NARROW SELF PRIORS
According to Bayesian models, priors are used to reduce vari-
ability in performance, while introducing a bias toward the prior
mean. This trade-off between bias and variability is well captured
in previous studies of Bayesianmodels of perception (Jazayeri and
Shadlen, 2010) as well as in our study. Bayesian integration is said
to “optimize” variability in performance, in the sense that the final
estimate (posterior) has a lower variance than both the sensory
evidence (“likelihood”) and prior. The importance of signal vari-
ability and “noise” are paramount for the normal physiology of
the central nervous system (Faisal et al., 2008), and for the sen-
sorimotor system in particular (Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000).
For example, in sensorimotor learning, motor noise during plan-
ning is taken into account for movement corrections, whose size
in turn minimizes the final variability of movement (Van Beers,
2009).
The unique aspect of Self priors is that they may not require
an initial learning in a new task. Although priors are normally
acquired through experience over time, by learning the probabil-
ity distribution of events over time (Berniker et al., 2010), Self
priors are obtained faster and more reliably than observation pri-
ors. Indeed, all participants reliably showed Self priors for their
own actions, whereas 5 of the 20 participants in Experiment 1
failed to demonstrate priors when observing actions. This fast
formation of prior expectations may be particularly important
when uncertainty about one’s performance is high, for example
during the performance of new motor tasks. Moreover, the fast
formation of Self priors may reflect a commitment to the expec-
tations of successful outcomes while alternatives are eliminated,
promoting consistency in perception that leads to a more sta-
ble interpretation of the external world (Stocker and Simoncelli,
2008).
The underestimation of one’s own errors (as a result of nar-
row Self priors) has been shown to support adaptive behavior
under adverse circumstances in an unstable environment (Taylor
and Brown, 1988). The ability to adapt appropriately to unex-
pected outcomes is crucial for learning and for the motivation to
learn through exploration. Impairments in this ability may lead to
“helplessness,” the belief that one’s actions can no longer influence
the environment, and the consequent passive behavior observed
in individuals with, or at risk of, depression (Seligman, 1972).
In Bayesian terms, helplessness has been formalized as prior
beliefs which underestimate one’s control over the environment
(Huys and Dayan, 2009). Low-control priors in individuals with
depression have detrimental effects on performance in that they
diminish exploratory behavior, as rewards become less exploitable
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and punishments less avoidable (Huys and Dayan, 2009). Priors
that overestimate one’s control can therefore be more adaptive,
supporting psychological well-being.
Similarly, wider (less “optimistic”) priors for one’s action may
be used in people with depression who exhibit a “depressive
realism” (Alloy and Abramson, 1988)—that is, a more accurate
perception of their own actions, with a smaller bias toward suc-
cess (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Kuiper and MacDonald, 1982).
Consistent with this hypothesis, we found an association between
the width of Self priors and trait optimism, suggesting that peo-
ple with narrower Self priors tend to be more optimistic. That is,
people who perceive the results of their actions to be closer to their
goal in the present, expect more positive outcomes in the future.
Taken together, narrow Self priors for one’s own actions may have
a significant contribution to adaptive behavior and psychological
resilience.
Other advantages of narrow Self priors are suggested by evolu-
tionary models, wherein the apparent short term sub-optimality
in the perception of one’s errors becomes advantageous in the
longer term. For example, when evaluating oneself under uncer-
tainty, if the cost of making false positive estimations is smaller
than the cost of false negative estimations, evolution would favor
overestimation (Haselton and Buss, 2000; Haselton and Nettle,
2006). Other evolutionary models have similarly shown that indi-
viduals who overestimate their capabilities tend to claim resources
they could not otherwise win, provided that the benefits from
the reward at conflict is sufficiently large relative to the cost of
competition (Johnson and Fowler, 2011). Perception of enhanced
performance also reduces the risk of giving up on resources indi-
viduals can surely win if it came to a conflict (Johnson and
Fowler, 2011), and increases the accumulation of resources, by
contesting in a larger number of conflicts (Johnson et al., 2011).
Self-deceptive superiority is also important in deterring oppo-
nents, thereby increasing the probability of successfully claiming
resources (Wrangham, 1999; Trivers, 2000). Finally, in Bayesian
models of control, prior beliefs which underestimate, but not
those that overestimate one’s control over the environment, have
detrimental effects on performance (Huys and Dayan, 2009).
ACTION OBSERVATION PRIORS
Unlike the exaggerated Self priors for one’s own actions, pri-
ors used for observing actions were more likely to represent the
learned distribution of sensory stimuli according to their real
probabilities. This was supported by the findings that the variance
of these observation priors was highly correlated with, and not
different from, the true distribution of the observed performance.
Importantly, compared to Self priors, the absolute deviation of
observation priors from performance was smaller. This accurate
acquisition of the variance of observation priors and the learn-
ing of the distribution of stimuli was relatively fast in our study
(Berniker et al., 2010), as these priors were calculated from about
100 experimental trials, following 50 practice trials.
Participants in our study showed high between-subject vari-
ability in these observation priors, and five participants showed
“flat” priors, suggesting they did not form reliable predictions
for perceiving the sensory consequences of observed actions. The
high variability in priors for observation could reflect individual
differences in the ability to generate sensorimotor predictions
for external events. Moreover, the high variability could express
individual differences in the attribution of an agent characteris-
tic to the observed computer’s actions and recognition of their
intention or goal (Kilner, 2011). For example, participants who
attribute more agency traits to the computer’s actions might show
narrower observation priors that are more similar to those used
for one’s actions.
Observation priors have been suggested to support the predic-
tion and understanding of observed actions through the recruit-
ment of the motor system (Gallese et al., 1996; Kilner, 2011). The
understanding of an observed action plays an important role in
social interactions as well as in motor learning and skill acqui-
sition (Mattar and Gribble, 2005). Although we generalize our
results in the Agent condition to observed actions, the observa-
tion priors in our study were not based on the observation of
another human agent performing the task. These priors might
thus be mainly based on the predictions of observed stimuli in
general, and be less influenced by the social cognitive factors that
typically accompany the observation of another human agent act.
Inferences of agency, however, do not require the explicit
observation of a human agent (Castelli et al., 2002). Moreover,
an action is not synonymous with a body part or movement of
that body part, but is the means of achieving a goal (Passingham,
1993). Our task design thus still allows for the fundamental inter-
pretation that differences in agency could lead to the use of
different priors for the perception of the sensory consequences
of actions.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, our results show that people’s perception of the
sensory consequences of their own actions is biased toward suc-
cess, which can be explained by priors that represent optimistic
predictions of performance. More research is required to establish
the specific neural substrates of Self priors, their benefits in health,
and how they might be altered in neuropsychiatric diseases.
Nonetheless, our study shows that Self priors can bind the sensory
consequences of our own actions with our intended goal, explain-
ing how it is that when acting we tend to see what we want to see.
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